

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	C/ACSI		X		
18	ES		X		
19	C/S		X		
20	D/SOVA		X		
21	D/OSWR		X		
22	NIG/SP		X		
		ASAP			
		SUSPENSE			
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Remarks
To # 5: Please have comments prepared for my signature, NLT 1030 Hrs, 14 May.

[Signature]

Executive Secretary

13 May 86

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May 12, 1986

Executive Registry

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on Interim
Restraint/Proportional Response Policy

The President would like your views and comments on the attached Statement on the US policy of Interim Restraint/Proportional Response as soon as possible, and no later than 12:00 p.m. Wednesday, May 14. Please hold this draft Statement closely and maintain a record of those to whom you give access to the draft.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


John M. Poindexter

Attachment
Draft Presidential Statement

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May 10, 1986

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I interim offensive agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. The Soviet Union, regrettably, had not. I noted that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. One simply can not be serious about effective arms control unless one is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded at that time that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals in the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, to give the Soviet Union additional, adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, the USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. As called for by our policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered both Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in some areas of U.S. concern, there has been no real progress in meeting U.S. concerns in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new ICBM type,

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continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force improvement program. Finally, after the Geneva summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow-up on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by me and General Secretary Gorbachev to seek common ground, especially through implementing in an appropriate manner the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and through an agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire two older POSEIDON submarines when the 8th TRIDENT submarine entered sea trials. In view of military and economic realities, it is common sense to retire these aging submarines as planned, rather than try to refurbish them.

As part of the same decision, I also announced last June that we would take appropriate and proportionate actions when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet non-compliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

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It is absolutely critical that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet non-compliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their non-compliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of their massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement, but rather would establish a more efficient production rate that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

We will face the next programmatic deployment milestone near the end of this year as the 131st U.S. heavy bomber is modified for cruise missile carriage. When this milestone is reached, the Soviet Union will have had a full year and one-half since my June 1985 decision to demonstrate whether or not it intends to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The United States has been exercising, and will continue to exercise, greater restraint than the Soviet Union in the modernization of our nuclear forces which we need as a deterrent to aggression. However, we must and will take those actions needed to provide sufficient, modern forces to underwrite our security and that of our allies. It is clear that I can not prudently continue along the current path indefinitely if the fundamental criteria I outlined in June, 1985, are not met. In fact, in the continued absence of comparable Soviet restraint, we will be required to enhance our deterrent forces further. This is a simple fact, not an ultimatum.

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Last June, I undertook to go the extra mile. However, the end of the "extra mile" is now in view if the Soviet Union does not take the positive steps required. More clearly than ever, the responsibility rests with the Soviet Union to join us in mutual restraint. It is high time for the Soviet Union to show restraint with respect to the growth of its strategic offensive forces. It is high time for the Soviet Union to act constructively with respect to the pursuit of deep reductions of existing arsenals. And, the time is long overdue for the Soviet Union to correct its non-compliance and behave responsibly with respect to its existing commitments.

I would also like to clarify U.S. policy with respect to the SALT II Treaty. SALT II is a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty that would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for outright defeat, or for major amendments requiring extensive renegotiation, before President Carter asked that the Senate not act on it following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The most basic problem with SALT II is that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at that time the Treaty was signed the U.S. had and only planned for 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted 1200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and SLBMs) even though the U.S. had about 1050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1200 MIRVed limits. What is worse, given the ineffectiveness of SALT II in constraining ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles can continue to grow significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

I have long been a critic of the SALT II Treaty. However, as I have stated, I decided early in my Administration that, in spite of these serious problems, the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement so long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this step in the hope of fostering an atmosphere conducive to the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements that would lead to deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

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In June, 1985, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine. I did so not to comply or abide by an unratified, expired treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and additional, adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. As I considered our options and consulted with the Congress and our Allies, I made it clear that I do not view the issue as one of complying or not complying with the flawed, unratified and expired SALT II Treaty -- but rather of what actions to take at this particular point under the policy of seeking an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, which I announced last June.

Our policy of interim restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. If the Soviet Union does, we can together achieve greater stability and a safer world.

For our part, the United States will continue to exercise restraint with respect to our own nuclear offensive forces under any circumstances. But I can assure you that with the bipartisan support of the Congress in this critical area, we will respond to the threat that we face. We will take those actions necessary to enable us to fully meet our national security needs, and our security commitments to our Allies. Therefore, I call, once again, on the Soviet Union to seize this opportunity to join with us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

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